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Religious prophets and ethical philosophershave of course at
all limes been mostly reactionaries,defending the old against
the new pnnciples.'
I. Introduction

Privatizing Public Lands
A Bad Idea
Scott Lehmann"

The Sagebrush Rebellion of the late 1970s was waged by
a loose coalition of Western politicians and economic interests-mostly ranchers-under the banner of states' rights.
Their official complaint was that the Western states had not
really been admitted to the Union on an "equal footing" with
the original thirteen states, as stipulated in their statehood
acts: The original states had secured title to all the Crown
lands within their boundaries, whereas states created from
federal territory were given much less, typically a few sections per township ("school lands-) for the support of public
education. This line of argument, if sound, would have supported state claims to nearly all federal land. But the
Sagebrush Rebels were willing to settle for less-the transfer of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land to the
states-because appeals to states* rights and "New
Federalism" were largely window dressing.
The Rebellion was animated not by discomfort with perceived legal inconsistencies or by federalist ideology, but
rather by the perception that outsiders were gaining the
upper hand over traditional users in influencing federal land
policy and management. The Carter Administration's "hit
list" of western water projects, its top-down promotion of a
mobile basing system for the MX missile in Nevada and
Utah and a massive synthetic fuels development program in
Colorado, and anecdotes about high-handed federal land
managers, all made the federal government a convenient
target. Underlying all the wrangling, however, was scarcity.
Having long had their way on federal lands, traditional grazing, mining, and logging interests now had to compete with
those who asserted interests in recreation, wilderness and
other environmental values, national security, energy independence, and fiscal responsibility. Ranchers and others
pushed for federal-to-state land transfers because they
anticipated better treatment from local statehouses-or,
having raised a ruckus, better treatment from Washington. In
any case, enthusiasm for federal-to-state land transfers subsided in the early 1980s as it became dear to the Sagebrush
Rebels that Interior Secretary lames Watt was "a good guy."2
OAssociate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut
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I. F.A.Hxiall LA~i Lrwmmou~ AN'DUEZEM, (THE_
PoLrnzAz OFDR or- A
F . ProPLE) 165 (1979). Hayek shared the 1974 Nobel Memonal Prize in
Economics with Gunnar Myrdal.
2. Vatt's own assessment of the way ranchers viewed him. as recorded
ina maeazine Interview. Bit Gilbert. Abne inife Wi Jqenws. s~ors ILLusWv-.
Oct. 3. 1983.at 96. 104.
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Recalling the fate of Nevada's school lands,
some critics of the transfer proposal warned that,
should BLM land become state property, much of it
would eventually end up in private hands. Other
critics, however, faulted the proposal precisely
because it interposed state ownership between federal and private ownership. Rather than advocate
transfer to the states (which in their view would
merely relocate the problem of scarcity), these critics urged privatization, which, they claimed, would
solve the scarcity problem efficiently. Some of them
pushed for privatization from within the Reagan
Administration, 3 though with little success. The
Administration did propose a modest Asset
Management Program to dispose of "surplus" lands,
but it was doomed by Congressional opposition
and Watt's advocacy. A Presidential Commission on
it directed
Privatization was established, but even
4
most of its attention to deregulation.
I review this recent history because it is already
in re-runs. The Sagebrush Rebellion has been succeeded by the County Movement, which aims at
local control of federal land policy. in 1980, dissatisfaction with government led to the "Reagan
Revolution;" in 1994, a similarly dissatisfied electorate delivered Congress to Republicans pledged
to end business as usual. It will certainly not be
business as usual on the public lands, if some
Members have their way. Bills have been introduced
to transfer BLM land to the states;5 to give Tongass
National Forest to the state of Alaska; 6 to direct the
Secretary of the Interior to determine whether certain units of the National Park System might not be
better administered "through partnerships or direct
management by states, local governments, other
agencies, or the private sector;"7 and to establish an
independent commission, which, along with drawing up a plan for consolidating the BLM and the
Forest Service (USFS), is charged with "reviewling]
the patterns of federal, state, and local public and
private ownership and control of land and considfor the purpose
er[ing] possible transfers of land ...
of allowing the most efficient and consistent management of the land and its resources."8 Outside of
Congress, calls for privatizing public lands are again
being heard.
Though wholesale privatization seems quite
unlikely, no one can know how this episode will play
3. Steve Hanke and William Niskanen (Council of Economic
Advisors), Richard Stroup (Director of the Intenor Department's
Office of Policy Analysis).
4. David E Linowes. et al., Pnvatization:toward more effective government (Washington: President's Commission on Prvatization, 1988).
5. H.R. 2032, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
6. H.R. 2413 104th Cong.. ist Sess. (1995).

out. Clearly, privatizing public lands is not as
unthinkable as it seemed even a few years ago, and
now seems a good time to give it some critical
attention. Those who dismiss the idea out of hand
are, I think, both wrong and unwise. There is more
to be said for privatization than such critics might
imagine, and sooner or later they are likely to be
embarrassed by their ignorance. On the other hand,
there is a lot less to be said for privatization than
some advocates claim. Indeed, it seems to me quite
a bad idea.
I argue here that what appears to be the fundamental argument for privatization-the efficiency
argument, which iustifies privatization as promoting
the efficient allocation of resources-is seriously
flawed. Insofar as this argument does present the
case that advocates have made for privatizing public
lands, they have not yet given us good reason to
think that such lands should be privatized.
Moreover, the weaknesses of the efficiency argument
also raise obstacles to arguing for privatization on
other grounds and ultimately provide openings for
opponents of privatization to defend public lands
and the current management system. Finally, some
of the criticism of privatization developed here
applies as well to marketization. Under marketization, public lands are retained in public ownership,
but their resources are to be allocated as if they were
privately held. That is, they are to be allocated as if
by a market. Since the rationale for marketization is
efficiency, problems with the efficiency argument are
also obstacles to justifying marketization.
II. The Efficiency Argument
Of the relatively small number of people who
are unhappy with federal land management (this is
my view from the East, anyway) most are dissatisfied because they don't like what it delivers. These
people have a vision of how certain public lands
should be used, a vision which federal management
does not realize. This group includes both environmentalists who think the Clinton Administration's
spotted owl recovery plan for the Northwest doesn't
go far enough and timber activists who think it goes
too far.
Though privatization advocates sometimes
advertize themselves as environmentalists,9 they
7. H.R. 260, 104th Cong.. 1st Sess. § 102(b)[ 11(A) (1995),
8. S. 1151. 104th Cong., ist Sess. § 3(b)(2) (1995).
9. Terry Anderson and Donald Leal, for example, regard
themselves as free-market environmentalists, A biographical note
in their book. TERRY L. ANDERSON AND DONALD R. LEL., FREE MARKET
192 (1991). describes them as "avid outdoorsENVIRONMENTALISM
men who.., are dedicated to sound natural resource management
and to the environmental principles set forth in this book,"
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generally do not promote some particular pattern of
use for public lands. Rather than specifying a preferred use for certain public lands and then arguing
that moving these lands into the private sector will
achieve that use, they place themselves above the
fray and ask what system of resource allocation can
best serve individual visions of the good. Like
Nobel Laureate lames Buchanan, they are unwilling
to pass judgment on any such vision, holding that
"the good" is whatever results from the free choices
of individuals in voluntary interactions: "A situation

Privatization advocates do not present their case
quite this simply. So, before criticizing the efficiency
argument, I shall fill it out by locating the premises
within their writings.

10. JmEs M. BucHANAN. THE LimTrs OF lia~m 2 (1975). By "situation" Buchanan appears to mean social institutions rather
than outcomes but he says later: "it is impossible for an external
observer to lay down critena for'goodness! independently of the
process through which results or outcomes are attained.... ITIo
the extent that individuals are observed to be responding freely
within the minimally required conditions of mutual tolerance and
respect, any outcome that emerges merits dassification as
"good.' regardless of its precise descnptive content." Id. at 6.
Buchanan was awarded the Nobel Memorial Pnze in Economic
Scence in 1992.

1I. E A. Hayek. Tfe Use ci Kns
s g In Scd.ty. 35 A% Eco:;.
REv. 519. 519-20 (1945). qi id In Rt:iaw L STFuP & JOHN A.

I11. Elaboration of the Effidency Argument

According to Richard Stroup and John Baden,
"Itihe world is populated by self-interested individuals constantly seeking ways to make themselves
better off."'2 This is Pl. Because "the forces of simis judged 'good' to the extent
pIe self-interest are relentthat it allows individuals to
less." 3 we cannot "'rewire
-no!
The Efflcle
get what they want to get,
vArgument
people so that the public
whatsoever this might be,
interest becomes self-interest." 4 But "Ibletter institulimited only by the principle Premise I ["Pl'] - Indlividuals are selfof mutual agreement." 10
interested.
tional arrangements can provide. incentives that channel
Pnvatization advocates are Premise 2 ["P2"1 - IIfin dividuals are selfthe efforts of imperfect men
fond of quoting Friedrich
interested, resou rcel will be most effiHayek, another Nobel recipiciently employed if they are privately
into productive and efficient,
ent, who maintained that
owned, ownershi]p bieing characterized
rather than destructive.,
"the economic problem of
by property rig :hts that are wellactivities." 5 In particular,
society is
how to secure
erlapping, secure,
defined and non
Terry Anderson and Donald
the best use of resources
and transferable.
Leal maintain that "good
resource
stewardship
known to any of the mem- Premise 3 ['P3"J - Pr ivatization would
bers of society, for ends
depends on how well social
create such right s in the resources of
whose relative importance
public lands.
institutions harness selfinterest through individual
only these
individuals Premise 4 j"P4"] - Re. sources are more
incentives."16
know."" They agree with
efficiently emplo yed as their use betHayek that a free market in
ter satisfies the dlest res of consurhers.
In the view of privatization advocates, private ownerprivately-owned resources is Premise 5 ["P5'1 - Sitt iations are better
superior in this regard to any
as the desires of' con sumers are better
ship of resources is the best
system of collective managesatisfied.
institutional solution to this
ment. however reformed and
problem. Given P4 and P5, this
enlightened, and argue that Conclusion I'C"l- P,ubli c lands should be
is P2,provided "most efficientpublic lands should, accordprivatized.
ly employed- is relativized to
ingly, be privatized.
institutions, i.e., understood
The appeal here is to
to be qualified "relative to
economic efficiency: public lands and the financial
what other systems could achieve." It is supported by
and human resources now committed to their manpositive considerations from economics and negative
agement would be better used if these lands were
considerations from public choice theory. The former
pnvate, where "better used" means more efficiently
remind us of the productivity of exchange, among
employed to satisfy the desires of consumers, as they
other things; the latter allege that collective manageindividually pursue their individual conceptions of
ment incorporates incentives for inefficiency.
the good life. We may render this appeal in premiseIf private property rights have the characterisconclusion form as the efficiency argument. (see box)
tics mentioned in P2. then I will do well by doing
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hmAG.EmEUr 104 (1933) and In &;Ds:i& LA. supra note 9 at 4.
12. Stroup & Baden. supra note 11. at 55.
13. Id.at 26.
14. Id.at 29.
15. Id.at 43.
16. AMo.o:i & Lvj. supra note 9. at 4.
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good, via production and exchange. Transferable
rights underlie exchange, which enables consumers
to trade up by exchanging resources they own (such
as their labor) for those they'd rather have (such as
something to eat). Secure rights allow for productive investment rather than having to capture benefits through consumption (for example, without a
secure right to the fruits of his labor, a farmer might
be better off eating his seed corn than planting a
crop). Where it is unclear what license rights confer,
such rights remain ill-defined and encourage wasteful conflict. Where rights overlap, exercise of mine
conflicts with exercise of another's, so my consumption and production may harm others:
because of such spillovers, I may no longer do good
by doing well. Doing well is getting what I prefer
(better satisfying my desires), doing good is
enabling others to get what they prefer (better satisfying their desires). As Stroup and Baden put it,
"[u]nder this system, individuals gain by doing what
,others desire most; they do well for themselves
when they do good for others." 17 Since people know
their own desires and preferences best, it's hard to
see how we could improve upon it.
By contrast, collective management separates
"authority from responsibility,"' 8 permitting individuals to shift to others the costs of attaining desired
allocations of public resources. In consequence, taxpayers at large help.bankroll many public land users,
whether they be ranchers grazing cattle on BLM
allotments at below-market fees, or backpackers hiking in Wilderness Areas at no charge. More importantly, the system encourages "transfer activity,"' 9 in
which interested parties expend time, ingenuity, and
money trying to enlarge their slice of the pie at others' expense, rather than in more productive activities that would enlarge the whole pie. Since the individuals who enjoy the benefits are generally not the
same as those who pay the costs, they have little to
lose by pushing for more benefits than they are will-

Ing to pay for. So, it is likely that costs often exceed
benefits and that resources are accordingly misallocated. Anderson and Leal, for example, suggest that,
because "those who benefit from wildlife preservation [in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge] do not
have to pay the opportunity costs of forgone energy
production, they will demand 'too much' wildlife
habitat."20 Add self-interested legislators and
bureaucrats, using the political system to advance
their own interests, 2 unchecked by a "rationally
ignorant"22 citizenry, and things look pretty bad,
Even if we suspend disbelief and imagine these folks
to be selfless servants of the public good, there is no
way for them to get the information about the
desires and preferences of the public required in
23
order to allocate resources efficiently.
While no entirely satisfactory account of efficiency is given in the privatization literature, there
is little doubt about the commitment of privatization advocates to this ideal. Thus, B. Delworth
Gardner speaks of "the efficiency norm"24 , and
Anderson and Leal argue that "the important question [regarding the Arctic National Wildlife Refugel
is whether all costs are internalized so that efficient
levels of oil production and environmental amenities are chosen." 25 Concerning the content and
worth of efficiency, Baden and Dean Lueck tell us
that "... an economic system is efficient if resources
are allocated so that no one can be made better off
without making altl least one person worse off. It is
difficult to think of a more worthy goal."26 The first

of these claims is a somewhat imprecise rendering
27
of the so-called Pareto criterion of efficiency,
which is one elaboration of P4. The second claim
approximates P5, provided that "better off" and
"worse off" are understood more precisely in terms
of individual preference, so that one is better off
with allocation 2 than with allocation I if one
prefers what one receives from 2 to what one
receives from I.

17. STRouP & BADEN, supra note 11, at 3.

ence on policy.

18. Id.at 41. "in order to be useful and beneficial to society

23. Anderson and Leal observe that the economic models
employed by the USFS and the BLM cannot produce efficient
allocations without information about the values that individuals
place on resources, and they doubt that such values can be
revealed by anything other than "voluntary trades," ANDERSON &
LEAL, supra note 9, at 13.
24. B. Delworth Gardner. The Case for Divestiture In RETHINKNG
TE FEDERAL LANDS 156. 161 (Sterling Brubaker ed,,1984).

as a whole, an institution must relate authority-that is. command over resources--to personal responsibility for the costs
and benefits that flow from decisions." Id. at 26-27. '[lIn the public sector,...those who make policy decisions do not bear all the
costs of those deasions." Id.at 42.
19. d.at 13.

20. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 9. at 15.
21. For development of this idea, see BucHANAN, supra note
10. at 156-61; WILUAM NIsIANEN. BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOvERNMENT (1971); RICHARD MCKENZIE & GORDON TULLOCK. THE NEW

WORLD OF ECONOMICS 196-210 (1975) (Bureacratic Entrepreneurs).
22. STROuP & BADEN, supra note 11, at 44; ANDERSON & LEAL,

supra note 9. at 15. Ignorance is rational if gaining knowledge is
costly relative to its likely benefits. But each citizen is iust one
among many and cannot reasonably expect to have much influ-

25. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 9, at 82.
26. John Baden and Dean Lueck. A Property Rights Approach to
Wilderness Management, in PUBLIC LANDS AND THE
U.S. ECONOMY 29, 43
(George M. Johnston & Peter M. Emerson eds., 1984),
27. Named for Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (18481923). For discussion, see ALLAN M. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 140 (1980).

Winier
996F
&gFL&~ [erafs

Minter 1996
IV. Criticism of the Efficiency Argument.
Turning now to criticism of efficiency argument,
I note in passing a slight logical problem: the conclusion does not quite follow from the premises.
The argument is consequentialist: it assumes that
once we know which course of action has the best
overall consequences, we know what we ought to
do. Some people deny this. One who asserts rights
against forced abortion or sterilization, while at the
same time conceding that China has a very serious
population problem that can't be solved without
effectively limiting family size provides a good
example. The problem for such non-consequentialists is coming up with something that looks more
important than consequences, properly assessed. I
don't see any way of doing so in this case, so I shall
not pursue this line of attack further. The point,
however, suggests a different line of defense for privatization, namely, make a convincing non-consequentialist case for private property rights. I shall
briefly consider this idea later.
Logic aside, there remain numerous substantive deficiencies with the argument: with the possible exception of P4, which can be regarded as partially characterizing the technical notion of efficiency, all of the premises are dubious. I begin with
familiar reminders of market failure.
Spillovers are excluded by non-overlapping
property rights, but this lust assumes the problem
away. It is a pity that God didn't undertake
Creation with the argument from efficiency in
mind, but He evidently didn't. There lust is no way
to divide this world up so that what one property
owner does with his property does not affect what
others do with theirs (unless, of course, we make
everything the property of one person). So P3 is
simply false.
Pnvatization advocates may concede as much,
but they will oblect that collective management
cannot be rationalized as a corrective to the
spillovers that inevitably arise in a private property
regime. They claim that public land management
also produces spillovers, which in their view dwarf
any that may be anticipated, were public lands to be
pnvatized (consider, for example, large-scale subsidized logging in the Tongass National Forest, once
again being promoted by the Alaska Congressional
delegation, which has a negative impact on fishenes and recreation). Privatization advocates go on
to suggest that we could use covenants to head off
28. Thus Barney Dowdle suggests that easements could be
used to secure a different mix of multiple-use outputs than would
be produced if government timberlands were pnvatized. Barney
Dowdle. The Case for Pm'atizing Government Owned Tirnferonds. In
PRJVATE
RIGHTS AND PUBuC LANDs 71,

82 (Phillip N. Truluck ed., 1983).

whatever significant spillovers privatization might
28
be expected to visit upon us.
This response essentially saves P3 by strengthening P2: in place of unattainable non-overlapping
property rights, we have rights that don't overlap in
certain respects. Since private property is no longer
idealized. P2's claim that such a system allocates
resources more efficiently than alternative systems
is stronger and consequently more dubious. Is it
really obvious that private firms like Louisiana
Pacific or Champion International would do better
in the spillover department than the USFS, were
they to control the National Forests? Are we prepared to say they would do better simply because
recreationists, say, would no longer have any defensible claim to enjoy what were formerly National
Forests and therefore could not be injured by their
destruction? 29 The suggestion that covenants be
employed to limit spillovers strikes me as odd.
coming from people who claim to have read Hayek.
It is difficult to imagine how covenants could adequately substitute for judgment informed by local
knowledge. Moreover, it is not clear how an adequate system of covenants encumbering private
property would differ from the current system of
regulated private use of public property, except perhaps in being even more cumbersome and litigious.
Finally, a showing that the current system produces
significant spillovers, or invests too much in preventing insignificant ones, or tends itself to substitute regulation by the book for informed judgment,
will suggest reform rather than revolution-at least
to those who are not Ideologues.
Another problem for P2 is transaction costs.
The costs of acquiring information and setting up
an exchange may block productive movement of
resources, particularly where (a) each of a large
number of people would derive a relatively small
benefit, or where (b) it is difficult to determine or
collect what people are actually willing to pay (or
exchange) for benefits. Public goods, which cannot
be provided to one consumer without being provided to every consumer, are standard illustrations of
problem (b), and they often exemplify (a) as well.
Wilderness. for example, has some value to many
people who will never visit it. Perhaps aggregate
willingness-to-pay for wilderness preservation, both
by visitors and non-visitors, exceeds what others
are in one way or another willing to pay for development, so that preservation is efficient (by one
standard measure). But unless the private owner
29. -When large Investors, dubs, partnerships. and corpora-

tions can purchase tracts large enough to incorporate what otherwise would be external effects, then the externalities are internalized.' Smctpu&a'.uEU. supra note 11 ,at 124.
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has some way to collect this sum, development may
prevail. By contrast, the current system has in place
mechanisms for acquiring such information and
effecting the required allocations.
Gardner speaks for privatization advocates generally in dismissing this objection as "largely a ruse
to justify political allocations of the kind now
extant."30 As in the case of spillovers, advocates of
privatization concede the general point, but maintain that the collective-management cure is worse
than the disease. If public goods tend to be undersupplied by the market, they tend to be oversupplied by the political process, where demands bear
no relation to willingness-to-pay. Thus Anderson
and Leal question the quality of information
acquired through public hearings, letters to
Congress, public opinion surveys, and the like. 31
Consider, for example, the recent regional hearings
on BLM wilderness in Utah. Those who choose to
testify or to comment are not a representative sam32
ple of the population. In any case, "talk is cheap,"
especially when directed to securing benefits for
oneself while shifting costs to others.
What's missing here, however, is a good reason
to believe that the distortions introduced by misinformation are more significant than those induced
by the friction of transaction costs. Instead of providing such a reason Anderson and Leal speculate
that entrepreneurs would figure out how to profit by
reducing these costs. 33 They suggest that environmental organizations like the Wilderness Society
could be cast in this role, inasmuch as they convert
dispersed concern for wilderness values into funds
for the organization to spend on acquiring land and
easements. This is a pretty flabby response, but
what else can you do? As Anderson and Leal concede, there is simply "no way of knowing whether
the efficiency effects of an understatement [of
amenity values due to free-rider problemsl will be
greater than those of an overstatement in the political arena where the provision of amenities is subsidized."3 4 This is an awkward admission for those
advancing the efficiency argument to have to make.
Anderson and Leal suggest that only "voluntary
trades" can reveal "the subjective values that
humans place on alternative resource use,"35 but
where resources end up in a free market reflects not
only the preferences of consumers but their ability
to pay. Each has an initial bundle of resources,
which they may attempt to improve by exchange.

Some will do a lot better than others, depending
upon the contents of that initial bundle. If I don't
have what others want (maybe all I can offer is
unskilled labor), I'm not going to do too well in satisfying my desires. None of the standard explications of P4 embodies any concern for equity, that is,
for reducing disparities in the distribution of goods
and services to consumers or for assuring some
minimum level of consumption. So, P5 seems to say
that equity doesn't matter. Some features of the
present public land management system, which
provides many services at below cost, might be
regarded as addressing equity concerns. What privatization dating from the colonial era has brought
to the East Coast is very expensive waterfront property, yet you don't have to be a multi-millionaire to
enjoy Thoreau's walk from Nauset to Provincetown:
you can do it for free in Cape Cod National
Seashore.
Privatization advocates do not think much of
appeals to equity, which they regard as a "more sublective goal"36 than efficiency. In fact, Stroup and

Baden worry about equity primarily because "Iilf the
market system fails to distribute costs and benefits
in ways that are considered equitable, individuals
may seek alternative methods of influencing that
distribution. "37 In particular, they worry that appeals
to equity might be used, as above, to argue against
privatizing public lands. They could of course
respond that public land policies such as free parks
and recreation, below-market grazing fees, and subsidized logging are not very efficient ways to achieve
equity: instead, they look more like welfare for the
middle class. We might possibly do better for the
poor ifwe simply transferred some income to them,
perhaps income raised by the sale of public lands.
However, this response appears to conflate what
might be done with what will in fact be done and
overlooks the political reality that, in this country,
the only way to assure that the poor receive anything is to give it to the middle class as well.
Spillovers, transaction costs, and equity are
familiar grounds for criticism in policy analysis. I
now turn to some problems with the efficiency argument which may be less familiar.
The efficiency argument lustifies privatization
as an efficiency improvement over the current system. It maintains that, were public lands to be prlvatized, resources would be more efficiently
employed than they now are, in the sense that the

30. Gardner, supra n9te 24, at 175.

34. Id.at 95.

3 1. ANDERSON & LE, supra note 9. at 92.

35. Id.at 13.

32. Id.at 83.

36. STRoUP & BADEN, supra note 11, at 21.

33. Id. at 21.

37. Id.

Winterlr1996ftEc [nris

Vintr 1996
desires of consumers would be better satisfied than
they now are. The problem is that none of the standard explications of "better satisfies the desires of
consumers" in P4 give us good reason to think this
is so, while some of them give us good reason to
think it is just false.
If allocations of resources are to be judged in
terms of desire-satisfaction, then they must be individuated in part by who gets what s Each allocation
ultimately delivers to each consumer a bundle of
goods. In line with P I's assumption of self-interested individuals, we think of each consumer as having
well-behaved selfish preferences over bundles, i.e.,
preferences which do not depend upon what others
get. How do we compare allocations about which
different consumers have different preferences?
Which better satisfies the desires of consumers?
What we encounter here is a version of the notorious problem of making sense of interpersonal utility comparisons.
We may try to evade this problem by adopting
the Pareto criterion: allocation 2 improves on allocation 1 if and only if no consumer prefers her Ibundle to her 2-bundle and at'least one consumer
prefers his 2-bundle to his -bundle. But this understanding of P4 dooms the efficiency argument,
because many people are going to prefer what the
current system now delivers to what privatization
would deliver. There may well be Pareto improvements over the current allocation of public lands
and resources, but privatization will not deliver
them. Perhaps an analogy will help make the point.
When I hike in the mountains, I do not like to have
to climb down in order to climb up, and I have done
some pretty dumb things to avoid this. Higher
points you can reach without descending are analogous to Pareto improvements. Climbing to the top
of the mountain is like attaining a Pareto optimal
allocation. There may, of course, be higher peaksother Pareto optimal allocations-but you cannot
reach them from there without descending: they
are, as it were, Pareto inaccessible. The allocations
promised by privatization advocates are similar to
these other peaks.
If your climbing goal is to reach the highest
point you can, you ought to be willing to sacrifice

some elevation to gain more. The efficiency analog
is that society, like an individual, should accept
some disappointment of desires in order to secure
their greater overall satisfaction. We need a criterion of efficiency improvement which will allow us to
count at least some shifts from 1 to 2 (hereafter 'to-2") as improvements even though some consumers prefer l-to-2. The basic idea is that of
regaining the lost elevation and then some: a shift
shall count as an improvement if the winners can
fully compensate the losers and still be winners.
Unfortunately, the standard ways of making this
out-the Kaldor criterion, or its consumer-surplus
variants, or a positive net-benefits test derived from
them39 -do not do much to advance the efficiency
argument.
First, these standards are of doubtful coherence: we can quickly dream up cases in which both
l-to-2 and 2-to-l count as improvements. 0 Since it
makes no sense to say that allocation 2 satisfies
desires better than allocation I and conversely, an
improvement standard that implies as much cannot
be an acceptable explication of P4. Second, to the
extent that losses are reckoned in terms of minimum willingness to accept compensation-that is,
to the extent that losses or costs are taken seriously-the efficiency argument may be no better off
than it was with the Pareto criterion. For if those for
whom there is no acceptable substitute for what the
current regime delivers to them can name their
price, privatization is going to be effectively vetoed.
Of course, this problem can be assumed away by
holding that reasonably cheap substitutes are
always available, regardless of what people claim.
But then we are either no longer talking about the
real world or we have abandoned the idea that people know their own interests best.
Let me put the second point somewhat differently. Privatization advocates like to contrast transactions in the free market, which proceed only with
41
the "willing consent"
of parties to them. with the
.wealth transfers 42 engineered by government. The
privatization of public lands, however, will be a
wealth transfer to which some people will not willingly consent. Some who now enjoy the use of public lands, whether to restore their spirits or to keep

38. Accordingly, production standards of the sort advanced
by Gardner, supra note 24, at 158. are inadequate.

minus costs, where benefits are reckoned in terms of willingness
to pay and costs in terms of willingness to accept; this is just the
cv-measure of consumer surplus for l-to-2, except that some
people are typIcally coerced Into accepting less than the" otherwise would for putting up with I-to-2.

39. i-to-2 is a Kaidor improvement if some (costless) redistribution of resources from 2 is a Pareto Improvement over I. My
consumer surplus for i-to-2 is the amount of money cv for which
I am indifferent between I and 2-cv (the "compensating variation"
measure) or the amount ev for which I am Indifferent between 2
and i+ev (the "equivalent vanation" measure); I-to-2 is an
improvement by either of these measures If the aggregate consumer surplus is positive. The net benefit of l-to-2 is benefits

40. For details, see Scotr Lmw;,n. Prr; uzG PuEuc Li ms
93-94. 105 n. 15 (1995).
41. Sr.oup & BAnru. supra ndte 1I. at 3.
42. Ild.
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food on the table, will lose. The new private owners
will exclude them or charge them more for use. Can
we imagine that people would willingly consent to
such a loss? Moreover, privatization will apparently
not increase efficiency. This does not mean we
shouldn't do it. But it does mean that the efficiency
argument does not provide the rationale.
I turn now to PI. As noted above, self-interest is
typically understood in terms of selfish consumer
preferences. But this makes PI false. I don't know
anyone who is interested only in the contents of his
consumption bundle, and I suspect that such people
exist only in the imagination of economists.
Buchanan may have pursued a career in economics
because it seemed to him "better than plowing," but
"better" here cannot mean more remunerative: he did
not choose the academy over the farm because he
expected thereby to maximize his income. 43
Similarly, it would be silly and insulting to suggest
that those who advocate privatization do so with a
similar expectation. Sometimes "self-interest" is
given a broader reading, as when Stroup and Baden
explain that "Itlo assert that individuals are primarily motivated by self-interest merely suggests that
when individuals evaluate the projected impact of an
action, their first question is, 'How will that action
affect the things I value?'"44 However, since this is
true of saints as well as sinners, it is much too weak
to support their claims about self-interest driving
transfer activity and bureaucratic expansion. Instead.
they need to argue that while we may have all sorts
of interests, the claims of self are much stronger.
Unfortunately, it is not clear where such a self is
to be found, given that all of us assume various
roles whose demands frequently conflict. This
makes it difficult even to give clear sense to the
notion of "claims of self," which seems required if
we are to maintain that such claims are supreme. In
addition to being a husband and parent, I teach philosophy, engage in scholarly research in fields
remote from the courses I teach, serve on a couple
of University committees, play in and write program
notes for a community orchestra, follow and comment on a variety of local, state, national, international issues, and so forth. Privatization advocates
seem to think that behind all these personae is a
self-the real me-which assumes these roles, like
so many suits of clothes, to advance its interests
and which resolves all conflicts between roles in its
favor. This picture strikes me as complete fantasy.
What we get when we strip away these roles is not a

controlling self, but nothing at all (or perhaps, as in
The Wizard of Oz, nothing much). It's like trying to
come up with a notion of the soul that owes nothing to the body. Conflicts between roles are of
course resolved by decisions we make, and we may
say, if we like, that these decisions reveal the self.
But the self that is revealed in this way is not much
like the creature assumed by privatization advocates.
An important class of interests that cannot be
assimilated to desires for bundles of commodities
consists of what Joseph Sax calls "collective val46
ues"45 and Mark Sagoff calls "citizen interests."
These are desires that a collective-the body
politic, perhaps-behave in certain ways. Suppose I
don't lust want the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
preserved as wilderness, so that I have the option of
seeing it in its present wild and undiminished state
someday, but that I do want the nation to do it In
recognition of the part that wilderness has played In
our history and cultural imagination. Suppose I also
want to help bring this about by participating in the
political processes by which we make such decisions. Such desires cannot, as a matter of logic, be
satisfied under privatization (it's the distinction
between wanting your daughter to do the dishes
and merely wanting them done), Since they are not
desires for consumption goods, these desires of
consumers are simply ignored in the standard explications of P4. Moreover, if you take collective values
or citizen interests seriously, disputes over the use
of public lands will look less like unproductive
wrangling over division of the pie and more like a
necessary part of the process of determining the
nation's values.
My final criticisms of the efficiency argument
are directed at P5 Readers of journals like
Environmental Ethics 47 will find this premise very
odd indeed, inasmuch as P5 seems to assume that
only humans count for anything, They will ask,
"What about wildlife, trees, rivers, ecosystems?
Are these really no more than resources, worth
something only insofar as they satisfy human
desires? Don't they have some inherent or intrinsic worth, which gives them some moral claim on
us in their own right?" While I have some sympathy for this view, I shall not advance it here. Let us
assume, with privatization advocates, that public
lands are resources and that our problem is to
devise institutions that enable us to get the most
out of them.

43. JAMEs M. BucHANAN. Better than Plowing, in ESSAYS ON THE
PouITICA ECONOMY 67 (1989).

the
Public Lands, 56 U. COLO. L.REV. 537 (1985).

44. STRoup & BADEN, supra note 1. at 4.
45. Joseph L. Sax. The Legitimacy of Collective Values: the Case of

46. MARK SAcOFF,THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988),

47. See, for example, Nicholas Agar. Valuing Species and Valuing
Individuals, 17 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 397 (1995).
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Still, we may not get the most out of things if
we think of them as resources which are there for us.
I imagine that most people have children in large
part because they expect to derive happiness from
the experience. But thinking of your children as
instruments to your own happiness is a recipe for
misery all around; you will almost certainly end up
a lot happier if you forget about your happiness and
attend to theirs.48 Some of the resources of public
lands may be a bit like children in this respect.
Many people value wilderness for the type of experience it affords. John Muir, recalling a solo trek to
the Sierra's Mt. Ritter in 1872, on which he very

nearly perished, writes: "In so wild and so beautiful
a region was spent my first day, every sight and
sound inspiring, leading one far out of himself, yet
feeding and building up his individuality."4 9 It is the
experience of something that is "other" but not
alien, something that has unfolded according to its
own design, something that is utterly indifferent to
our successes or failures, something which is
emphatically not there for us. This experience is not
available to one who regards the wilderness merely
as a resource. To the extent that privatization
encourages us to regard a wilderness as a commodity which exists to satisfy our desires, privatization
is counterproductive. if. for example, your wilderness experience is purchased in the free market like
so many fir 2x4s, you may be distracted by such
questions as "Am I really getting my money's worth
here?" (The same point can, I think, be raised
against proposals by Randal O'Toole and others
that such experiences be rationed by price.' 0 )
The most glaring deficiency of P5, however, is
that it makes no demands whatever on the content
of desires. When we seek, as P5 directs, to best satisfy the desires of consumers and to consider what
institutional arrangements would do so, we take
desires as given. The social task is to better satisfy
desires, not to better them. But better satisfying
desires makes sense only if the desires are worthwhile to begin with. If my idea of the good life is a
life of dissipation, then I'm better off if I don't get
what I want. And so is society, on the individualistic
assumption that societies are better off as their
members are better off.
When Socrates asked, "How should we live?", it
was not because he lived a couple of thousand
48. An instance of the so-called paradox of happiness: those
who seek happiness generally end up with a lot less of it than
those who don't.
49. JOHN MuiR, A Near View of the High Sierra, In THE MouTAMS
OF CAUFO.rNA 48. 56 (1917). Robert Marshall argues for wilderness
preservation by appealing to the valuable aspects of the wilderness expenence in Robert Marshall, The Universe of the Wilderness Is
Vanishing, NATuRo
MAcAzi , April 1937. repnnt.d In THE LvltG

Kefirl]
M-k I.Cris
P~a~zfi~ Pit~c Li~r4s
years before the modem theory of the consumer
was developed. The answer provided by it---!As high
in your preference ranking as your income allows'would not have satisfied him and it shouldn't satisfy us either. For his question is really. 'What preferences should I have?- Surely there is a distinction
between what I'm interested in (what I desire) and
what's in my interest (what's desirable for me). The
most vivid examples are addictions or compulsions
of various sorts. Yet all of us, I'm sure, have desires
we'd be better off without. We need all the help we
can get in revealing and modifying them.
A possible response to this objection, suggested by what some privatization advocates say, is simply to deny the distinction between what I desire
and what's desirable for me. Your judgment that a
life of dissipation is undesirable, despite my desire
for it, simply reflects your own desires. Anderson
and Leal suggest this view when they write of the
subjective values that humans place on alternative
resource use."51 They tell us that "Inlone of these
values is right or wrong; each simply represents a
special interest"52 This response, I think, is neither
plausible nor wise. It is not plausible, because it
makes nonsense of something that seems to make
perfectly good sense: namely, wondering if what I in
fact want is really worth having, if it is really what I
ought to want. It is not wise, because the normative
claims of the efficiency argument-C and P5-then
tell us nothing about what is desirable but merely
something about the desires and preferences of
whoever makes these claims. The force of the argument Is then only that, should you happen to believe
PI-P4 and happen to prefer situations in which the
desires of consumers are better satisfied (this preference being no better or worse than any other), you
then ought (logically) to prefer privatization.
A less catastrophic response is to admit the
distinction, but to suggest that it is not relevant
here. This amounts to maintaining that privatization would have no negative effect upon the content
of desires. I think this is false. Public lands, it seems
to me, have a role in bettering desires, both via the
processes by which we collectively decide how they
are to be used and the uses to which these processes lead. Like families, schools, libraries, museums,
concert halls, and opera houses, public lands are
educational institutions.
Summer 1971, at 8.
50. RAum. O"atLo, R'-M.,
Hmz
Foaasr SM4CE (1988). In
o'roole's vision of reform, "lalllocations between uses [of the
National Forestsl would be based on willingness to pay: Id.at
205.
51. Anmrsso:u & LEAL.
supra note 9.at 13.
52. Id.at 82.
iVt.canrss.
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Ifyou want to influence the way in which public
resources are used, you must join with others of like
mind, present a case for your favored use, and
respond to those which different visions of the best
use. All of these exert pressure toward more critical
reflection on our preferences, and none is present
in commercial transactions. When privatization
advocates look at public land disputes, they see
unproductive transfer activity; when they look at the
free market, they see productive exchange. These
judgments are sensible if preferences are taken as
given and worth satisfying. If,however, our concern
is to better these preferences, then it is the reverse
judgments that are sensible: free exchange of private resources is unproductive, whereas disputesat least civil disputes-over the use of public
resources are productive.
In the view of Anderson and Leal, "citizens 'hire'
politicians or bureaucrats to produce certain goods
and services" and must then confront the problem
of assuring that "the state is producing the desired
bundle of public goods."' 3 They assume that each of
us brings to the political process well-defined preferences over private bundles that include public
goods. These preferences, together with income
and prices, yield (in theory) well-defined individual
willingness-to-pay schedules for varying amounts of
such goods, which permit us to imagine that there
are efficient levels of these goods and to ask how we
might structure the state so as to deliver levels that
are in that neighborhood. This all seems to me a
case of art-in the form of elegant economic models-dictating to life. The preferences that people
have about public goods are very largely formed in
the process of public deliberation and debate about
their provision; they are not antecedent to it. To
what, for example, do we owe the current interest in
wilderness? Not to instruction at home or the blandishments of outfitters, but to public policies that,
in effect, saved some wilderness for us and to public debate over its fate.
Moreover, many of the public resource allocations represented in National Parks and Wilderness
Areas, grazing policy, timber policy, etc. can be
regarded as reflecting a collective determination
that certain things are desirable but, at the same
time, threatened by market forces-that is, threatened by desires. Ifwe value them, we must remove
them from the market. To elaborate:
Suppose we reflect that it's a good thing for
people to be taken out of themselves once
in a while and observe that exposure to the
53. Id.at 17.
54. Lehmann, supra note 40. at 204. The Powell quotation is
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otherness of the natural world is a particularly effective way of achieving this detachment; and suppose we note that the market
system encourages neither detachment nor
the desire for it, and indeed that satisfying
consumer desires for lumber, minerals,
vacation homes, etc., requires subjugating
nature. Then we might well consider setting aside National Parks and Wilderness
Areas, limiting recreational development
of them, banning overflights by aircraft,
enforcing pristine air-quality standards for
them, using devices other than price of
admission to ration their use, etc.
Or suppose we reflect that it's good for people to compare others' sacrifices with their
own, to reflect on the uses and abuses of
power, to wonder about human progress
and their own contribution-or lack thereof-to it. Then perhaps we'd do better to
preserve historic battlefields as memorials
rather than letting the real-estate market
convert them into shopping malls and
planned recreational communities.
Or suppose we conclude that individuals
and individuality flourish -in communities
and ways of life with links to the past or
roots in the land; and suppose we notice
that these are threatened by what John
Wesley Powell called "the rapacity of individuals," which the market does little to
discourage. Then we may turn to historical
zoning and subsidized but regulated grazing of federal lands, 4

V. A Non-Consequentiallst Case for Property Rights
This concludes my criticism of the efficiency
argument, Its deficiencies do not show that its conclusion is false, though many of them, I think, stand
in the way of showing that it is true. To see how such
obstacles arise, let us briefly consider how one might
argue for private property rights without appealing,
as does the efficiency argument, to their beneficial
consequences. If such a case could be made, we
might have an argument for privatization that
bypasses the objections to the efficiency argument.
However, this is more easily imagined than
achieved, since the standard justifications for property rights are consequentialist. John Locke, for
example, appeals to the benefits of dividing common
from JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION
OFTHE UNITED STATES
50 (1962) (1878).
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property into mine and thine and to the beneficence
of the Creator. "God gave the World to Men in
Common; but since he gave it them for their benefit,
and the greatest Conveniences of Life they were
capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed that
he meant it should always remain common and
uncultivated." 5 Rights in general are sometimes
rationalized in terms of a Hobbesian social contract
among self-interested individuals: the correct rules
governing social interactions are those that individuals would, on the basis of rational self-interest, agree
among themselves to live by. This makes property
rights, which would presumably be written into such
a contract, appear to derive from a promise to abide
by its terms. But of course this promise is entirely fictitious and in any case is rationalized by expected
consequences: the contracting individuals are selfinterested and expect to be better off, if they live by
the rules, than they are in the state of nature.
One's rights define a sphere of free action, where
others may not enter uninvited. While freedom is
usually taken to be instrumentally valuable (as when
Hayek argues that freedom enables individuals to
use their own local knowledge-and, through
exchange, the local knowledge of others-for their
own benefit56), this is not the only possible view.

Buchanan, for example, holds that individual freedom is not to be valued merely "as an instrumental
element in attaining economic or cultural bliss."' 7 He
is not very forthcoming about why one should hold
such a view, why it is not lust a quirky "private preference."' 8 However, his remark that, without rights

respected by others. "an individual, as such, could
hardly be said to exist"59 suggests a Kantian outlook,

in which free individual choices create value.
Freedom. secured by individual rights, permits one
to choose and pursue one's own ends, rather than
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worth satisfying.P Freedom not only enlarges our
command of means but is required to make our ends
ours and worth the application of means to achieve.
There is a lot of murkiness here, but it is at least
clear that, for Kant, not every desire corresponds to
an end worth achieving. My wanting something
does not give me a reason to get it unless my desire
issues from my rational nature. Urges and cravings,
whether creatures of the subconscious or of advertisers, will not pass this test. Among the imperatives of rationality for Kant are charity and excellence: a rational agent cannot be indifferent to the
welfare of others, nor can it neglect the development of its own gifts and talents. Kant's arguments
are, as so often, obscure, so it is not clear whether
one should follow him here. 61 But the basic idea
seems to be that the freedom to choose, to author
one's own life, carries with it a weighty responsibility: it is not something to be squandered. With this,
I should hope, we can all agree.
But if so, we must again confront the problem,
raised against P5. of desires for what is undesirable.
here in the form of desires that are unworthy of our
nature and opportunities. Paradoxically. no one who
takes freedom seriously can agree that anything
goes, or be comfortable with the idea of simply giving everyone rights and then stepping aside to let
them act as they will, constrained only by the rights
of others. Instead, such a person will wrestle with the
problem of how to encourage the wise use of freedom without at the same time destroying it. I have
suggested above that supplementing the private
realm with a public realm, encouraging in various
ways critical reflection on the difference between
what's desired and what's desirable, might be part of
its solution. Privatization advocates will not like this
solution, but what can they offer in its place?
a

remaining so much material-a mere resource-for

others. For Immanual Kant. it is the selection and

VI. Marketlzatlon

pursuit of particular ends by rational agents that

gives those ends value; only if my desires are mine in
the sense of issuing from my rationalnature are they
55. JoHN LOCKE. Two TRzFAisEs oF GovRNM En 333 (Peter
Laslett ed.. Mentor 1965) (3d ed. 1698).
56. In Hayek's view. free societies have evolved to solve the
problem of ignorance: each of us Is ignorant "of much that helps
him to achieve his aims." Friedrich A. Hayek. THE CO snnmoN oF
22 (1960). By affording "the maximum of opportunity for
hBEmRT
unknown individuals to learn of facts that we ourselves are yet
unaware of and to make use of this knowledge in their actions"
than any one Individsuch societies utilize "more knowledge
ual possesses or than it is possible to synthesize intellectually.id. at 30.
57. Buchanan. supra note 10, at 2. Elsewhere he tells us that
"the 'wealth of nations*as such. has never commanded my attention save as a valued by-product of an effectively free soety."

I turn now to marketization. Marketization. in
the present context, is the idea that even if federal
BUCHAUAU. supra note 43. at 84.
supra note 10, at 1. He suggests that it follows
58. BucwAr,.
from the "basic premIse" that"each man counts for one. id. at 2.
but this just moves the problem there. Unfortunately. he also
describes his commitment as 'methodological." 1. at 1. as

though to say. "Ifyou share my private preference here. you will
be Interested Inwhat I have to say In the follrwing pages:
59. Id.at 10.
60. with enough Imagination, such a view may be extracted
from Kant's notoriously difficult Gou aoz mTHz ?AinmT.cs OF

MoRAqs (lames W.Ellington. trans.. 1931) (1785)
61. See Kants third and fourth examples of the application
of the respect-for.persons version of the Categorical Imperative.

Id.at 37.
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lands are to be retained in public ownership, we
should in one way or another let the market allocate
their resources. For example, grazing rights might be
sold at auction, or grazing fees might be set by
resource economists who take into account prevailing fees for comparable private forage. Marketization
has the same goal as privatization, namely, the more
efficient use of public resources. Theoretically at
least, marketization could address the spillover and
transaction cost problems I raised against the efficiency argument: hire enough clever resource economists and the allocation of public resources could
be as if by a perfect market. Perhaps equity concerns
could be addressed as well. But other problems with
the efficiency argument persist as problems for marketization. It is just as unclear how marketization
would improve upon the current system, if improvement is to be understood in terms of efficiency.
Citizen interests are ignored, just as they are by privatization, because efficiency has no place for them.
And basing management decisions on aggregate
willingness-to-pay assumes that current tastes are
to be! gratified rather than elevated.
The prophets of the environmental movement
would never have allowed that the worth of their
ideas could be judged by aggregate willingnes-topay to see them implemented. So it's really quite
bizarre to find some of their disciples endorsing
marketization. Muir's reaction to sheep in the
meadows around Merced Lake in Yosemite was,
"The money changers [are] in the temple."6 2
Environmentalists who call for raising federal grazing fees to market rates seem to be saying, "It's OK,
as long as they pay market rates for the space. "63
Now, of course, what these environmentalists think
is that market rates will force the money changers
out of the temple, and perhaps that's so. But this is
a very risky line of attack on the problem of overgrazing. For once you appeal to aggregate willingness-to-pay, you are stuck with it. And it is by no
means clear that aggregate willingness-to-pay for
preservation, say in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge, is going to exceed aggregate willingness-topay for development.

This problem owes nothing to transaction costs
or other imperfections in real markets, and therefore cannot be fixed by simulating perfect markets.
What makes "free market environmentalism" close
to an oxymoron is not so much the imperfections of
real markets as the fact that efficiency has no necessary connection to environmental values and is in
many cases inimical to it. An instructive example Is
Anderson and Leal's efficiency defense of 19th century logging practices, 6' which most environmentalists would consider simply a reductio ad absurdum of
the notion of efficiency.
Whether marketization would be worse for environmental values than privatization is not clear. I've
noted that marketization could, theoretically, get
around some of the transaction-cost barriers to
environmental preservation in the free market.
However, under marketization, willingness-to-pay
rules, unchecked by willingness-to-accept. The
resources of public lands will be put to whatever
use people are, in aggregate, willing to pay most for,
and that the use may not be preservation. In Its
1885 report to the New York Legislature recommending the creation of what became the
Adirondack Park, the Sargent Commission claimed
that "private ownership means-sooner or laterforest destruction."65 Since "later" covers a lot of
time, I don't know whether this is false, but there
appear to be counter-examples. However, those
that come to mind are not profit-maximizing timber
and paper corporations, whose behavior indeed
often suggests a "basic incompatibility of our economic system with forestry," as Jerry Bley of Maine's
Northern Forest Lands Council.puts it 66 Rather they
are those owners who care more about the woods
than about profits-and can afford to do SO. 6 7
Ownership is power, and some resource owners
exercise it wisely. Of course, by refusing bids they
"pay" the opportunity costs for satisfying
their
strange preferences, but this is rather different from
having to come up with the money.
Contrary to Anderson and Leal's suggestion," the
incentives for good forestry provided by the opportunity to collect recreation fees from hunters and others

62. JOHN MUIR, The Glacier Lakes. in THE MOUNTAINS OF
CAUFORNIA, supra note 49, at 116.

66. Quoted in DAVID DOBBS AND RIcHARD OBER, THE NORTHERN
FOREST
133 (1995).

63. For example, Peter A.A. Berle, then President of the
National Audubon Society, urged the Clinton Administration to
"get the prices right" because "below-cost timber sales, belowmarket grazing fees, over subsidizing water for agricultural uses,
land] giving away minerals, are policies that waste and misallocate public resources." PeterAA Berle. TheAudubon View: A New
Era forAmenca's Public Lands, AUDUBON, Jan.-Feb. 1993.6.

67. From the external perspective of the economist, those
who choose to make less money than they might are simply consuming in a non-standard way, spending the money they might
have made in order to achieve other goals. Internalizing this perspective, however, might not be very smart.

64. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 9, at 40-47.
65. Quoted in Frank Graham, Jr., THE ADIRONDACK PARK 104
(1978).

68. "Private timber managers for International Paper, for
example, are being forced to consider wildlife habitat In their timber production decisions because prices tell them that consumers are willing to pay increasingly more for hunting, camping,
and recreation." ANDERON & LEAL, supra note 9, at 11.
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are generally inadequate. As corporate raiders know,
there's more money to be made by clear-cutting and
high grading and then subdividing the miserable
remains for recreational development. More generally,
conservation makes economic sense only if interest
rates are sufficiently low.6 And the problem for the

forests and other resources of the public lands is that
marketization of public land policy promises us economic sense, free of the distortions introduced by
owners with their idiosyncratic tastes.
It may be possible to avoid such conclusions if
"marketization" is understood in a weaker sense. We
might (a) turn to'the market as a means to achieve
certain social ends, the choice of which is not surrendered to the market, or we might (b) let the market decide on the ends as well, holding that whatever allocation of resources the market produces is the
one we ought to have. Both (a) and (b) might be
termed "marketization." (b), the stronger variety, is
assumed in my criticism above. The weaker version,
(a), is seen in schemes to control air pollution or to
preserve fisheries by setting up a market in tradable
emission allowances (TEAs) or individual transferable quotas (ITOs). Here we decide how much pollution, or how large a catch, is acceptable, and then
issue permits in one-unit denominations for that
amount. Such TEAs (or ITOs) may then be exchanged
among would-be polluters (or fishermen), with the
result that the desired level of pollution (or harvest)
is attained at least cost.70 The desired level need not
be the efficient level. The efficient level of air pollution is reached when the marginal cost of abatement
equals its marginal benefit; we might decide we want
cleaner air. Ifinterest rates are sufficiently high, net
benefits might be maximized by taking all the fish
right now, thereby destroying the fishery; we might
prefer a sustainable harvest.
Public land management might be marketized
in the weak sense in various ways. For example,
where nominal admission fees now encourage overcrowding in some National Parks, we might decide
how many visitors are consistent with a "quality
park experience" and set fees high enough to discourage more. More generally, we might settle on
how certain'lands are to be used and then contract
out their management to private firms, assigning to
drastically downsized federal land management
agencies the task of letting and overseeing these
contracts. O'Toole's proposal .that current federal
69. Fora general discussion, see Daniel Fife. Killing , e G00e,
ENVIRONMEr. April 1971, at 20. For a specific case, see ANDEsoN
& LxAL, supra note 9, at 47.
70. For a warning of hidden costs in the form of undesirable
side effects, see STEVEN KEmAN, WHAT PRICE I cNT.FvES?
ECONoNUsTs AND TE ENVIRONMENT 27 (1981) (Ethical theory and the

management units be converted into public land
trusts might also fit this general model, although
merely requiring that the lands be managed "in
trust for the people of the United States " 17 seems to
permit too much, especially in view of his requirement that the trusts pay their way, covering operating expenses by member dues and user fees.
In theory, weak marketization can evade most of
the objections I have raised against privatization
and strong marketization. But of course theory and
practice are likely to diverge. The idea presupposes
more agreement than we sometimes now have
about how public lands should be used. Broad
agreement that Yellowstone should be a National
Park does not yield agreement on how many people
should be allowed in on the 4th of July. Similarly.
agreement that certain lands should accommodate
a variety of uses does not translate into agreement
on multiple-use management plans. Those who
take an interest in particular National Forests or
BLM Districts often acquiesce in plans they don't
like partly because such plans are never the last
word: there is always another opportunity to make
your case to agency personnel, members of
Congress. or federal judges. It would, I imagine, be
quite different if these plans were the basis of contracts with private managers. Moreover. while competition for management contracts might lower the
cost of achieving management goals, this is hardly
certain, since effective oversight is likely to be quite
expensive.
VII. Conclusion
I have argued that the efficiency case for privatization-or marketization-is flawed. In itself, this
does not show that either of these proposals is a
bad idea, though I think the problems with the
appeal to efficiency are obstacles to supporting
them in some other way. I should acknowledge in
closing that the holes in the efficiency argument for
privatization or marketization may be bigger for
some public lands than for others. Some readers
will have noticed that my examples were not
designed to bring this out. I think it is true that a
stronger case can be made for privatizing most BLM
land or marketizing its management than for privatizing Grand Canyon National Park or marketizing
its management. But one can admit that a case is
case for concern about charges).
71. Randal O'Toole, Reforming Public Land Management
with New Incentives 5 (Oct. 11-13. 1995) (paper presented at
Challenging Federal Ownership and Management Public Lands
and Public Benefits. Conference at the Natural Resources Law
Center. University of Colorado School of Law).
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stronger without admitting that it is strong, and this
one seems to me pretty weak.
Moreover, the weaknesses of the efficiency
argument supply general reasons for having public
lands, whose management is not surrendered to the
"wisdom of the market." Such reasons obviously fall
short of justifying the current pattern of federal land
holdings and management regimes, whose history
owes little to such considerations. Still, the current
pattern is where we are. It represents a large political investment and grounds many expectations. The
burden of proof rests with those who would alter it.
This burden may be relatively easy to meet in some
cases, such as land trades to consolidate scattered
holdings (checkerboard lands) or to eliminate nonconforming in-holdings (such as patented mining
claims or school-land sections in National Parks or
Wilderness Areas). In other cases, such as largescale transfers of federal land to the states, it is
much more difficult.
As a state employee myself, I am bemused by
the currently fashionable idea that the states can
generally do better than the federal government in
delivering services. One cannot help suspecting
that the appeal to federalism is little more than a
cloak for dismantling federal programs like Aid To
Families With Dependent Children or Medicaid.
Federal agencies tend to be better funded and better staffed with better people than corresponding
state agencies. State legislatures are even more vulnerable to lobbyists than is the national legislature,
because state legislators, unlike their federal counterparts, generally cannot call on a professional
staff or on resources similar to the Congressional
Budget Office or Office of Technology Assessment
for independent assessment of the effects of contemplated legislation. Finally, state issues tend to
get less attention from the media and the citizenry
than do local and federal issues.
Transferring federal lands to the states may

empower state citizens, but it would disenfranchise
the rest of us. My Congressman pays some small
heed to my views on federal grazing policy, but writing the Governor of Nevada would be a complete
waste of time. State and local governments often
lack the financial resources to manage land or other
properties well-or the political will to do so. Why
is state-owned range in Utah in even worse shape
than that managed by the BLM? 72 Because the State
of Utah won't invest any money in it. Why does the
federal government end up managing urban open
space, such as New York's Gateway National
Recreation Area, or historical properties of local
interest, such as the Wier Farm National Historic

72. Michael Loring and John P. Workman, The Relationship
Between Land Ownership and Range Condition in Rich County. Utah, 40

ambitious citizen inventory of BLM lands undertaken after the
agency's own perfunctory review. H.R. 1500, 104th cong,, Ist
Sess. (1995). A rival bill introduced by James Hansen (R-UT),
H.R.1745, would designate 1.8million acres (the BLM's recommendation was i.9 million); allow roads, pipelines, and the like
on them; and prohibit management of any other BLM lands for
wilderness values. H.R. 1745, 104th Cong.. ist Sess. (1995).
76. Alaska Governor Tony Knowles invokes such a bond in
arguing for opening up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil
exploration and development in Tony Knowles, Open Alaska's
Wildlife Refuge. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, at Al5. Alaskans do
indeed have a "special bond" with the land each receives an
annual Permanent Fund Dividend from interest earned on oil
lease revenues deposited in the Alaska Permanent Fund, The
Fund is established by Article IX, Section 15 of the State
Constitution. Dividends are distributed under provisions of Title
43, Chapter 23 of the state statutes. For discussion, see GERALD A,
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73. One impetus for the proposed review of the National
Park System, supra note 7, is the idea that the system has accumulated numerous units that lack national significance. See JAMES
RIDENOUR. THE NATIONAL PARKSCOMPROMISED: PORK BARREL POLITICS
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74. During the 1965 legislative heanngs on the dam proposal, Congressman Morms Udall (D-AZ) asked at one point "IHIlow
many cabdrivers, carpenters, and bncklayers, and ordinary Godfearing taxpaying citizens are members of the Sierra Club?" Lower
Colorado River Basin Project: Heanngs on H.R.4671 Before the
Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., IstSess. 645 (1965)
(statement of Committee Member Moms Udall (D-AZ)).
75. Hinchley's bill, H.R.1500, would designate as BLM
Wilderness the 5.7 million acres proposed by the Utah
Wilderness Coalition. The Coalition's proposal is based on an

Site in Connecticut? 73 Because, again, neither the

City of New York nor the State of Connecticut is willIng to steward the resource. Finally, most federal
land is in the West, and that presents a problem. At
present, Western states appear to compete for the
distinction of electing the most unenlightened
Congressional delegations on public-land issues,
We owe the absence of dams in the Grand Canyon
not to Western Congressmen but to people like
John Saylor of Pennsylvania 7 4 Today, the national
interest in wilderness values on BLM land in Utah is
represented not by the Utah delegation but by
Congressman Maurice Hinchley of New York.5 Such
examples are easily multiplied, and they belie the
easy assurances that Westerners have a "special
bond" with the land76 that would make Western
states fine stewards of public lands.
General appeals to "special bonds," the virtues
of federalism, and the like do not justify transferring
federal land to the states, any more than appeals to
economic efficiency, consumer sovereignty, individual freedom, and the like justify privatization or
marketization. It is too easy to expose the shaky
foundations and limitations of such appeals. If
there are good reasons for intergovernmental transfers or for privatization, they are of a different type
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and scale. The Catholic Archdiocese of Denver
would like to construct affordable housing for ski
industry workers in Summit County, Colorado,
where they otherwise cannot afford to live. Perhaps
this would indeed be the highest and best use of a
few acres of National Forest or BLM land.7 7Sterling
Forest, a privately owned 20,000 acre tract of forest
within 40 miles of New York City, is going to be
developed unless the federal government contributes some money to help the states of New York
and New Jersey buy it. Perhaps auctioning off 56,000
acres of National Grasslands in Oklahoma is the
only politically feasible way to preserve the Forest,
given the opposition of "Western lawmakers who
contend that the Federal Government already owns
too much land and...Republican leaders who have
-oblected to the failure to find offsetting costs."78 To
the resolution of such questions, appeals to the relative efficiency of markets or of state and local governments are likely to contribute nothing, at best.

77. See It Always Comes down to Finding a Place to Li'e, HIGH
CoumN" NEws. Apr. 17. 1995. at I1; Public Landsfor Ncedy Ski Resorts.
HIGH CouNmRY NEws. Oct. 16. 1995. at 7.
78. Jerry Gray, Gingnch Backs Buying Tract on Jerey-New, York
Border. N.Y. TImhs. Dec. 3. 1995. at Ai.
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